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Abstract—Virtualizing middleboxes as software for Cloud
tenants can eliminate the monolithic processing and static de-
ployment of legacy middleboxes and provide an efficient provi-
sioning for security services. However, inefficient managing of
the virtualized security services can reduce the gains of Cloud
deployment. We propose a resources-efficient placement of the
security functions in the infrastructure of a three-tier Cloud
DC by modifying the Best-Fit Decreasing algorithm to solve
the problem while satisfying the placement resources and traffic
constraints.
Keywords—Security services in Cloud Data Centers, Softwarised
security, virtualised Security placement, Resource-aware allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
A typical security system for a Data Center (DC) usu-
ally consists of a combination of bespoke hardware-based
(middleboxes) e.g., Firewalls and Intrusion Detection and/or
Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS), and Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) appliances, deployed in fixed locations [1] which re-
stricts the ability of the infrastructure to react rapidly to
changes or respond to attacks [2]. These middleboxes are
expensive high-performance vendor-specific appliances with
limit extensible functionality and results in vendor lock-in.
As ICT is increasingly outsourced to the Cloud, middleboxes
start the transition with the emerge of increasing number of
virtualized network appliances such as WAN optimizer [3] and
IDPS [4], [5], and in-the-cloud network services offered by
Cloud Services Providers CSP or third party companies [6].
Virtualized security services offer the same protection that
hardware-based systems provide combined by the high perfor-
mance and efficiency of Cloud services. For instance, virtual-
ization of security will remove vendor lock-in and increase the
rapid developing of more effective security solutions, resources
provisioning in virtualized environment allows flexible scaling
and increases the resource usage efficiency, the flexibility of
deployment of virtualized services will offer a rapid response
that raises the efficiency of the system to handle attacks and
changes in traffic and infrastructure.
However, the lack of tools to efficiently manage in-Cloud
middleboxes can introduce performance degradation and/or
reduce the benefits of Cloud deployment [6]. For instance, the
complex nature of traffic workload processing in middleboxes
complicate the process of allocating and scaling resources
in the Cloud. Furthermore, inefficient network placement or
routing can affect network performance create bottlenecks and
cause unnecessary scaling.
Research Challenge: We address the problem of allocating
virtualized security in Cloud DC by introducing a resources-
aware placement methodology to solve the placement problem
of security modules in virtualized environment, while main-
taining an efficient management of resources and satisfy the
traffic constraint of modules’ allocation. Our contribution is i)
A classification of the security functions based on processed
traffic constraints ii) Defining the placement problem of the
stateless security class and its objective which based on
maximising residual resources iv) A modified version of the
Best-Fit Decreasing (BFD) algorithm to solve the problem
and a comparative assessment with the Best-fit (BF), First-Fit
Decreasing (FFD) and First-Fit (FF) algorithms.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses
related work while Section III introduces the placement prob-
lem of security functions and in Section IV, we adopt a
modified version of the BFD and provide a performance and
comparative assessment in Section V. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
With the emerging of virtualized middleboxes as a solution
to mitigate the problem of hardware-middleboxes and with en-
terprises moving to the Cloud, Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) technology proposed as a framework for implementing
virtualized network function in virtualized environment [7].
Although much research attention has been drawn to the
different aspects of managing dynamic in-network services
in virtualized environments, yet only a few consider the
distinct characteristic of the security functions in the process of
managing services. The authors in [1] address the allocation
of security services in virtualized environments and discuss
their challenges. They model the allocation problem in ISP
networks to minimise the cost of network operators as a mixed-
integer linear programming (MILP) problem but no results are
reported. Gamber et al. [6] suggest an orchestration layer for
virtualized middleboxes that is network-aware and enforces
network policies through chaining. It uses horizontal scaling
to leverage performance which means dividing traffic flow over
two paths to solve resource bottlenecks and SLA violations.
However, it only considers functions that process traffic on the
flow level.
What distinct our work from previous research in dynamic
management of virtualized services is that (i) it addresses the
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unique characteristic of security services such as traffic con-
straints which impose a restriction on allocation and (ii) how to
achieve efficient management of virtualized environment while
(iii) maintaining the satisfaction of the security requirements.
III. SECURITY MANAGEMENT
As users run different applications in Clouds DCs, they
require different levels of security per application. For exam-
ple, a typical web server may require protection against HTTP
flood attacks and SQL injection, while critical servers may
require a combination of solutions to guarantee availability
and data integrity such as firewall, IDS and/or DPI. We focus
on managing security services over multi-tenant Cloud DCs.
Tenants can request security services which are offered as a
set of deployed modules from a pool of security modules, e.g,
firewalls, IDS/IPS and DPI. They can be deployed in the DC
where they can process traffic destined to the requesting tenant.
A placement algorithm is responsible for selecting allocations
for security requests to satisfy the request requirements and
constraints and maintain an efficient management of the DC
resources. As the security services are offered per tenant basis,
it will provide the customization to fulfil tenants need for
different security services and level of protection.
A. Architecture
Most Cloud DCs follow the three-tier network architecture
as a multi-rooted tree with three layers of switches (TOR,
aggregation, and core) [8] such as the k=4 fat-tree topology
shown in Figure 1. We assume routing is flow-based Equal
Cost Multiple Path (ECMP) [9] The security modules are
deployed at points collocated with switches in all layers. Traffic
is steered from switches to the security modules and back as
shown in Figure 1. This approach is opposite of how VNF
commonly deployed in rack hosts, However, our approach
reduce the detour length that traffic have to go through to
pass the virtulaized middlebox and consequently reduce traffic
delay impose by the security function deployment. The security
function abstraction can be implemented as a distinct names-
pace within a software switch or on a separate, virtualized
commodity x86 architecture physically connected to a traffic-
forwarding switch.
Fig. 1. Fat Tree Cloud Data Center size k=4
B. Placement of Security Modules Problem
The placement problem can be defined as selecting a
location to fulfil a tenant’s requests for a security module. The
placement must guarantee that the module is working correctly
by satisfying the module requirements and constraints such as
the required traffic is passed to the module, enough computing
resources are available at the location for the module to process
the traffic. The cost of allocating the modules varies based on
the location point(s) selected, e.g., one allocation may require
traffic to be steered to a non-shortest path while another may
require multiple instances to be deployed. Therefore, when
many allocations satisfy a module’s allocation constraint, the
placement methodology is responsible for selecting one of
them based on the certain objectives which make it a resource
allocation problem. While each location collocated with a
switch has limited resources and the cost is different from one
to another, the objective can combine computing resources,
power consumption and/or communication cost.
1) Traffic Constraints: Security modules process traffic in
different ways depending on how threats are being detected.
Traffic can be processed on a per-packet, per-flow, or per-flow-
aggregate basis where each level can provide protection of
different types of the security vulnerabilities. For example, per-
packet or per-flow processing cannot detect threats that span
multiple flows such as (e.g. DDoS flooding, worm spreading,
probes). Thus, each module requires different granularity of
traffic processing and the distribution of traffic over the DC
will constrain the allocation of security modules to locations
where this granularity can be satisfied. for instance, in a three-
tier architecture, all traffic destined to a server is passing by a
ToR switch. While in higher layers of the architecture traffic
destined to a host traverses multiple (parent) switches and only
a fraction of the flows is observed at each switch. Based on
that we have produced a set of equivalence classes of security
functions based on the detection method of different attacks
and subsequently the granularity of the traffic being processed.
Stateless (packet-based) class: Represents modules that
process traffic at the individual flow or packet level. Detection
or mitigation decisions are made based on the state of a
single packet or flow. Therefore, replicated instances of this
class can be distributed across multiple network locations. This
can be achieved by per-flow routing and by placing duplicate
detection modules at diverse network locations where traffic
matching a certain specification is being split due to ECMP
routing.
Stateful (flow-based) class: Represent security modules
that process traffic to extract anomalies based on the deviations
from normal behaviour which require processing traffic on
coarser granularity than a single flow. Steering all the intended
monitored flows to one instance of this type results in an
accurate construction of the behaviour model. However, some
modules may be able to periodically share meta-information
between distributed instances that work together which can be
an alternative to steering the entire flows to one instance.
Network-Wide class: Represent modules detecting
network-wide threats such as probes and worms which
cause distribution changes in traffic features that can be
observed at high aggregation levels [10]. Therefore, this class
monitors aggregate packets/flows and consequently they can
be allocated to centralised/core locations where aggregate
traffic to multiple destinations can be processed.
2) Resource Constraints: While each location has limited
computing resources defined by a vector (CPU cores, Memory,
I/O bandwidth and Storage, etc.), each request from a tenant
must be associated with a similar vector of the estimated
resource required which is the resources required for the
modules to process the required amount of traffic. The chosen
allocation must then satisfy the resource requirements of the
request where the resources available at the chosen location(s)
must be greater than or equal to the resources requested,
and only the allocations that satisfy the traffic and resource
constraints are considered in the selection process. Although
the resources required by a security module depend on many
factors such as (hardware, configuration, platform, the rule set,
traffic rate, etc), traffic intensity is the main factor to consider
under the same platform [11]–[16]. Thus, each security module
available to be requested by tenants will be associated with a
resources vector that represents i) baseline resources which
is the amount of resources required for initial deployment of
the module and ii) traffic resources which is resources per
traffic unit associated with each traffic type such as (e.g TCP,
HTTP, mixed traffic, etc.) and represents the estimated amount
of resources required to process a unit of traffic of this type.
Besides, each request will be associated with estimated rate(s)
of each traffic type(s) to be processed for the requested tenant.
C. Placement Objective
The placement of security modules, which are requested
by tenants over a Cloud DC in distributed locations collocated
with network switches, casts as a resource allocation problem.
We introduce the initial placement problem of the stateless
equivalence class. In the fat-tree k=4 in Figure 1, switches
and links carrying the traffic for host h8 (in gray) are shown
in dashed lines, and a security module requested for tenants
residing on this host will have three locations (shown in yellow
blocks) satisfying the traffic constraints to be considered: i)
single instance of the security function is deployed at the ToR
switch of this server, covering all traffic destined to/originating
from that host ii) two instances of the function are deployed
at the aggregation switches routing traffic to/from this host iii)
four instances of the function are deployed in the four core
layer switches.
Since there will be more than one allocation that will satisfy
the resource and traffic constraints of allocating a request, one
that optimises the placement objective will be selected. For the
stateless equivalent class of modules, we design the placement
objective to achieve i) an efficient management of resources
while keeping maximum ii) request satisfaction ratio. For
efficient managements of resources, maximising the residual
resources of the framework after placement will save resources
to accommodate more requests in the future. While to achieve
maximum request satisfaction ratio, a simple minimizing to
the number of unsatisfied requests can be used, however,
minimizing resources of the unsatisfied requests will leverage
the utilization of resources in case of requests are more than
the system can accommodate and satisfying requests with more
resources will increase profits where Cloud services are offered
on pay-per-use basis.
IV. PLACEMENT METHODOLOGY
The placement of security modules is an instance of a
variable cost – variable size bin packing problem (VSBPP) [17]
where switches can be represented as bins, the security mod-
ules are the items, bin size is the resource capacity of the
switches, and the price is the resource consumption of modules
to be allocated. As bin-packing problems are shown to be NP-
hard [18], many gready algorithms proposed to solve it. Best-
Fit Decreasing (BFD) are the most widely applied. In BFD,
items are sorted in decreasing order and the sorted items are
allocated in the best location to fit them as a minimum empty
space will be left after the allocation [19]. The BFD algorithm
uses the best fit strategy to utilise resource consumption. We
have adopted a modified version of BFD called power-aware
best fit decreasing that is used to reduce power consumption in
VM placement by allocating VM to the allocation that causes
the least increase in power consumption [17]. We replace
power consumption of VM placement by resources consump-
tion as the cost function in security modules placement.
The proposed BFD resource-aware allocation algorithm
sorts requests and then allocates each request to the Bets-fit
(BF) location. Firstly, it sorts requests by the amount of
required resources to deploy one instance for each in a
decreasing order. Then it calculates the cost of allocating
the request to each level, the algorithm only consider the
allocations that have enough resources to accommodate the
request, and finally selects the BF allocation by selecting level
that causes the least increase in total resource consumption
(min cost) as illustrated by the following algorithm:
BFD Placement Algorithm
Input: H,M,S,Q,L
Output: A,Unsatisfied Requests
1: Sorted Q← sort(Q) // sort by requested resources
2: for all h,m ∈ Sorted Q do
3: min cost←MAX
4: level found← 0
5: for all l ∈ L do
6: if (A.Enough Resources(h,m, l) == TRUE) then
7: cost← calculate cost(A, h,m, l)
8: if (cost < min cost) then
9: level found← l
10: min cost← cost
11: end if
12: end if
13: if (level found 6= 0) then
14: A ← A.Allocate(h,m, l)
15: else
16: Unsatisfied Requests← h,m
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: return A, Unsatisfied Requests
Note: The function sort(Q) sorts the request list Q by
the decreasing order of resources required to satisfy each re-
quest. The function Enough Resources(h,m, l) ensures the
resources required in level l is enough to accommodate request
(h,m). The function calculate cost(A, h,m, l) calculates the
resources cost of allocations A after allocating request (h,m)
to level l.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Performance metrics
We introduce three metrics for evaluating our placement
methodology: i) Placement Ratio (PR) achieved by the alloca-
tion algorithms, which represents the ratio of satisfied requests
out of the total number of requests. For example, PR with the
value of 1 will indicate satisfying all requests by finding the
allocation that satisfies their constraints, while a less than 1 PR
indicates a failure ratio where not all requests been allocated
ii) Residual Resources (RS) of the network, which is the ratio
of the spare resources (after placement) to the total amount of
resources available to the allocation and calculated by adding
the residual resources at each location after placement. RS is
a normalisation of our first objective presented in Section III
and will indicate the efficiency of resources usage as the ratio
of saved resources after allocation in case of PR is close to
1 iii) Unsatisfied Resources (US) which equals the sum of
resources of the unsatisfied requests out of the total resources
requested by modules. US indicates the utilisation level of
resources in case of PR is less than 1, where an efficient
algorithm will result in less amount of unsatisfied resources.
US is normalization for our second objective.
B. Models Comparison & Performance Assessment
We compare the proposed BFD algorithm with three re-
source allocation algorithms: First-Fit (FF), Best-Fit (BF),
and First-Fit Decreasing (FFD). Specifically, in the FF, the
unordered requests are allocated to the first level that fit them.
In the BF, the unordered requests are allocated to the best
fit location, where the total cost is minimised. In the FFD,
the requests are ordered in a decreasing order based on the
resource consumption and are allocated to first fit (module
types with high resource consumption allocated first). In the
BFD, the requests are ordered with the same way as in the
FFD, and then are allocated to the best-fit location.
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Fig. 2. Residual Resources and Unsatisfied Resources of BFD, FFD, BF and
FF algorithms when p=10 and k=6
We assume traffic is uniformly distributed on all servers
and each server represents one tenant. All switch locations
have an equal initial capacity of resources for the allocation
of modules. Modules are simulated as different-sized families
based on the baseline resources The families’ sizes are dis-
tributed evenly across the location capacity size. The resources
required by a request are calculated as described in Section
III with the traffic part equals 20% of the baseline part. We
simulated the Workload as a ratio of resource requested out of
the total resources available to the allocation, and that these
percentage is distributed evenly on the tenants where a tenant
can request modules with total resources less than or equal
its share of the workload. Tenants request modules in random
with maximum one of each family. For simplicity, we consider
resources as a one-dimensional vector. All results are computed
over an average of 50 runs.
The result of PR versus US of BFD, FFD, BF and FF in
Fat tree with k=6 and number of families p=10 at different
workloads are shown in Figure 2(a). An efficient algorithm
will result in high placement ratio and low unsatisfied re-
sources. Figure 2(a) depict an efficient performance for the
four algorithms in low workload, however, when workload
is more than 0.5 the decreasing order algorithms exhibits
less PR than other algorithms but less US where allocating
different sizes of modules may result in not allocating more
number of modules but resulting in less total of the unsatisfied
percentage of requested resources. In the other hand, we shows
the effect of the workload as on the performance metric RS in
Figure 2(b). RS exhibits a reduction as workload increases
where the increasing of requested resources will result in
a reduction in the spare resources. When the workload is
less than 0.5, the BF algorithms have more RS than the FF
algorithms, where BF utilizes resources by selecting a location
that causes the least increase in resources, allowing more
resources to the allocation process and leading to increasing
in RS that can reach 30% of other algorithms. While when
workload is more than 0.5 and PR start dropping, decreasing
based algorithms BFD and FFD exhibit less residual resources
than non-decreasing order algorithms in spite of them having
less PR as they allocate fewer but larger requests and end
up with less remaining resources. Thus, the BFD algorithm
demonstrates better utilisation of resources and satisfies both of
our objectives. Our future-work include experiment to find the
scalability of the algorithm with network size and increasing
number of modules families.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We study the problem of efficiently allocating modularized
security services in Cloud DC to protect tenants against
network threat such as DDoS, Worms and Probes. We provide
a classification of security modules based on traffic processing
in the detection process. We define the residual resources and
the resources of the unsatisfied requests after the allocation
as the placement objective and proposed a modified version of
the Best Fit Decreasing algorithm for the solution. We evaluate
our approach with three other algorithms and demonstrate that
BFD significantly increases the residual resources objective,
outperforming the other algorithms up to 30% while satisfying
the constraints of the problem.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work has been supported in part by the UK En-
gineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)
projects EP/L026015/1, EP/N033957/1, EP/P004024/1, and
EP/L005255/1, and by the European Cooperation in Science
and Technology (COST) Action CA 15127: RECODIS –
Resilient communication services protecting end-user appli-
cations from disaster-based failures.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Basile, C. Pitscheider, F. Risso, F. Valenza, and M. Vallini, Towards
the Dynamic Provision of Virtualized Security Services. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2015, pp. 65–76.
[2] D. A. Joseph, A. Tavakoli, and I. Stoica, “A policy-aware switching
layer for data centers,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM
2008 Conference on Data Communication, ser. SIGCOMM ’08.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2008, pp. 51–62. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1402958.1402966
[3] (2017) Silver peak sd-wan optimizer. [Online]. Available:
https://www.silver-peak.com/
[4] (2017) Snort intrusion detection system. [Online]. Available:
https://www.snort.org/
[5] (2017) The suricata open source ids, ips, and nsm. [Online]. Available:
https://suricata-ids.org/
[6] A. Gember, A. Krishnamurthy, S. S. John, R. Grandl, X. Gao, A. Anand,
T. Benson, V. Sekar, and A. Akella, “Stratos: A network-aware or-
chestration layer for virtual middleboxes in clouds,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1305.0209, 2013.
[7] R. Cziva, S. Jouet, and D. P. Pezaros, “Gnfc: Towards network function
cloudification,” in 2015 IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtu-
alization and Software Defined Network (NFV-SDN), Nov 2015, pp.
142–148.
[8] X. Meng, V. Pappas, and L. Zhang, “Improving the scalability of data
center networks with traffic-aware virtual machine placement,” in 2010
Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, March 2010, pp. 1–9.
[9] C. Hopps, “Analysis of an Equal-Cost Multi-Path Algorithm,”
Internet Requests for Comments, Internet Engineering Task Force,
RFC 2992, November 2000. [Online]. Available: http://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc2992.txt
[10] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella, and C. Diot, “Mining anomalies using
traffic feature distributions,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.,
vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 217–228, Aug. 2005. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1090191.1080118
[11] J. S. White, T. Fitzsimmons, and J. N. Matthews,
“Quantitative analysis of intrusion detection systems: Snort
and suricata,” pp. 875 704–875 704–12, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2015616
[12] K. Salah and A. Kahtani, “Performance evaluation comparison of snort
NIDS under linux and windows server,” Journal of Network and Com-
puter Applications, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 6 – 15, 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1084804509001040
[13] W. Bul’ajoul, A. James, and M. Pannu, “Improving network intrusion
detection system performance through quality of service configuration
and parallel technology,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
vol. 81, no. 6, pp. 981 – 999, 2015, special Issue on Optimisation,
Security, Privacy and Trust in E-business Systems. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022000014001767
[14] I. Karim, Q.-T. Vien, T. A. Le, and G. Mapp, “A comparative
experimental design and performance analysis of snort-based intrusion
detection system in practical computer networks,” Computers,
vol. 6, no. 1, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-
431X/6/1/6
[15] M. Fisk and G. Varghese, “Applying fast string matching to intrusion
detection,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2002.
[16] C. Sanders and J. Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring: Col-
lection, Detection, and Analysis, 1st ed. Syngress Publishing, 2013.
[17] A. Beloglazov, J. Abawajy, and R. Buyya, “Energy-aware resource
allocation heuristics for efficient management of data centers
for cloud computing,” Future Generation Computer Systems,
vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 755 – 768, 2012, special Section: Energy
efficiency in large-scale distributed systems. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167739X11000689
[18] D. S. Johnson, Bin Packing. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2016,
pp. 207–211.
[19] M. R. Chowdhury, M. R. Mahmud, and R. M. Rahman,
“Implementation and performance analysis of various vm placement
strategies in cloudsim,” Journal of Cloud Computing, vol. 4, no. 1,
p. 20, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13677-015-
0045-5
